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CHARLES KINDLEBERGER: AN IMPRESSIONIST IN A MINIMALIST WORLD
* 





  Minimalist economists stubbornly resist Charles Kindleberger’s characterization 
of investor expectations in a financial bubble as “irrational.”  This paper seeks to resolve 
the controversy by imbedding Kindleberger’s well-researched, impressionistic theory of 
financial crises into an expanded, but still-minimalist model of rational expectations.  
Introducing the concepts of malicious disinformation and rational overpromotion creates 
an informational environment in which it is time-consuming and costly to distinguish fact 
from fiction.  Rationality still requires that expectations and market fundamentals move 
together over long periods of time, but dishonorable overpromoters can earn substantial 
profits in the interim. 
 
 
  During the last five decades of Charles Kindleberger’s distinguished career, 
composers, painters, and economists developed a strong professional commitment to 
minimalism.  By minimalism, I mean a determination to pare one’s work down to an 
abstract and elemental core. 
  In music, the arch-minimalist is Philip Glass, who consistently turns handfuls of 
repeated notes into intriguing rhythmic and harmonic structures.  In painting, drip 
painters and monochromaticists celebrate a similarly sparse aesthetic of beauty.  
Minimalist economics values theoretical and statistical models in part by the degree to 
which they simplify the portrayal of complex phenomena or processes.   
  During Charlie’s academic years, three intertwined minimalist paradigms 
ascended to prominence in financial economics: the Modigliani-Miller Theorem and the 
twin hypotheses of rational expectations and financial market efficiency.  The 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem clarifies that sometimes it doesn’t make any difference 
whether a corporation loads a little or a lot of debt into its capital structure.  One of the 
several conditions needed to produce this result is that debt and equity markets be 
informationally efficient.  Markets are described as semistrong-form efficient when 
equilibrium prices are based on expectations that rationally incorporate at least all public 
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information.  Strong-form efficiency requires that even private information is fully 
captured in equilibrium prices. 
  As a self-styled literary economist, Kindleberger resisted the simplifications 
embodied in the Modigliani-Miller and rational-expectations paradigms with all his 
might.  In my mind’s eye, I envision Charlie as trying to explain to a class of 
monochromatic painters that they need to enrich their palettes if they want to get things 
right. 
  In contradistinction to minimalist models in finance, Kindlebergers’s fact-rich, 
impressionistic theory of financial crises (1978, 1996) posits that irrationally optimistic 
expectations frequently emerge among investors in the late stages of major economic 
booms.  When this occurs, investors grossly overestimate the future profitability of hot 
firms.  These overestimates lead even well-meaning managers to issue unsupportable 
amounts of debt and unscrupulous managers to overpromote their firms vigorously and to 
issue bogus debt and equity with abandon.  The more a firm’s managers sincerely 
overestimate their growth opportunities or successfully promote a Ponzi-style fraud, the 
more securities they try to issue.  When the unrealistically optimistic profits fail to 
develop as predicted, debt and stock values collapse.  Markets for overpromoted financial 
assets may even dry up.  The more severe the price decline, the more the collapsing value 
of previously high-flying assets spreads insolvency to creditors of both the overexpanded 
firms and their stockholders. 
  As an homage, this paper attempts to reconcile Charlie’s theory of speculative 
bubbles and financial crises with the rational-expectations and market-efficiency 
hypotheses by adding the color of endogenous asymmetric information to the minimalist 
palette.  I hope to persuade minimalists to recognize the advantages of dipping their brush 
in a daub of behavior I call rational overpromotion.  Rational overpromotion occurs 
when dishonorable persons can earn profits for a nonnegligible period of time by framing 
false opinions and data in ways that fool a great many people. 
  Charlie emphasized that market participants “are from time to time driven by 
emulation” (Kindleberger, 1994).  The historical evidence he so thoroughly investigated 
(especially his chapter on swindles) shows that overpromoters’ ability to disinform 
potential suckers in a persuasive manner can play a central role in amplifying and     October 12, 2004 
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prolonging speculative bubbles.  In Manias, Panics, and Crashes (3
rd Ed., 1996, pp. 24-
25), Kindleberger observes that in a bubble speculation “often” develops in two stages.  
In the first “sober” stage of investment, seasoned professional investors and analysts are 
gradually persuaded that bubble assets offer a good chance of high returns.  In the second 
stage, “professional company promoters—many of them rogues interested only in quick 
profits—tempted a different class of investors, including ladies and clergymen.” 
  My friendly extension of this insight is twofold: to claim that “rogues” play a 
critical part in all bubbles and that rogues are at work at other times as well.  I doubt that 
Charlie would warmly welcome this cynical extension of his theory.  He was a man of 
such admirable moral standards that he preferred to think that rigorous recruitment 
procedures assured that the standards of most top corporate and government officials 
were equally high.  On many occasions, both in conversation and in correspondence, 
Charlie advised me that he found it aesthetically unpleasant to place lying and other 
dishonorable activities—as I am wont to do—at the epicenter of models of corporate and 
(especially) government behavior.  During my student days, my fascination with 
incentives for tax and regulatory avoidance and my insistence that traders in forward 
markets possess a potentially valuable option to renege led him to wonder how I could 
possess such a devilish mindset.  About a year before he died, the two of us finally agreed 
on the compromise proposition that—at least in recent years (though not necessarily in 
other trying times)—legal and cultural controls against faithless managerial, regulatory, 
and trader behavior seem to have lost a great deal of incentive force. 
 
I. Limits of Metaphorical Language 
 
  Language is metaphorical and even the hardest sciences have their “black holes,” 
“big bangs,” and “asteroid belts.”  The problem with colorful metaphors is that they 
convey misleading entailments as well as instructive ones. 
  Both in musical composition and in painting, impressionism involves the use of 
strong tonal colors to evoke moods and situation.  In writing, impressionism is the theory 
and practice of emphasizing larger aspects of objects or actions without dwelling on     October 12, 2004 
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details.  In both senses, Charlie’s research on financial crises lies firmly in the 
impressionist camp. 
  In various editions of Charlie’s Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of 
Financial Crises, Charlie states his belief that “markets generally work but occasionally 
break down” (1996, p. 4).  Soon thereafter (1996, p. 6), he characterizes markets as 
irrational when speculation becomes destabilizing.   
  Everyone knows that, as mere mechanisms for trading things (or better claims to 
things), markets themselves cannot literally be described as either rational or irrational.  
Nor is it fair to say that a market is not working when speculative traders base their trades 
on mistaken judgments.  In fact, during the run-up phase of a price bubble, market-
makers typically execute a substantial volume of orders for members of the misherded 
“herd.”  Finally, markets do not truly “break down” at the top of the bubble when traders 
suddenly learn that their previous expectations have proved wildly inaccurate.  What we 
observe is a sudden “rush for the exit” that creates an order imbalance, whose clearing 
price takes fearful but rational market-makers a while to locate and support. 
  Garber (2000, p. 9) notes that Kindleberger defined a bubble as “an upward price 
movement over an extended range that then implodes” and that this definition is neutral 
as to the source of the bubble.  In contradistinction to Charlie, Garber attributes three 
famous 17
th and 18
th Century bubbles to “fundamentals” rather than to trader or market 
“irrationality.”  He didn’t push the bubble metaphor quite so far, but we might reinterpret 
Garber’s challenge as asking which of two pumps actually supply the gasses a bubble 
encloses.   
  In my first term at MIT, I heard Charlie articulate what he called “Kindleberger’s 
Law of Alternatives.”  According to this law, the answer to every sensible either-or 
question that can be formulated in economics is “both.”  The law applies neatly in this 
case.  As interacting drivers of asset prices, fundamentals and irrationality are 
impressionistic names for forces whose effects cannot in the end be sharply 
distinguished. 
  The value of minimalism lies in stressing the benefits of reining in the profusion 
of colorful images conveyed by impressionistic names for crisis phenomena: crashes, 
manias, panics, bubbles, irrationality, herding, stampedes, and breakdowns.  Garber’s     October 12, 2004 
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attack on Kindleberger’s theory of crises seems to me to emphasize distracting elements 
rather than the central features of the colorful word mania.  Charlie’s analysis holds up 
equally well if we replace mania by the milder word fad or even by Shiller’s (2000) 
colorless, but telling phrase positive feedback loops. 
  To explain a bubble economically, one needs only to provide a unified account for 
two contrasting phases of price movement: a lengthy up followed by a sudden large 
decline: A large and long-lasting overvaluation that is corrected in something like one fell 
swoop.  In minimalist financial economics, upward and downward asset-price 
movements can be driven by either homogeneous or heterogeneous expectations among 
individuals that change over time.  Minimalism only requires that the path of individual 
expectations must eventually track evidence of fundamentals in a logically consistent 
way.  This means that expectations and fundamentals are simultaneously determined.  
The economic (i.e., market) process of converting today’s expectations into tomorrow’s 
fundamentals and the psychological process of converting evidence on the past and 
current behavior of fundamentals into expectations are twin activities that adaptively 
influence the time path that each other follows. 
  With rational expectations and symmetric information, what minimalists call a 
“rational bubble” may exist.  In a rational bubble, investors are assumed to be aware that 
the securities they hold are trading at higher prices than are justified by their current 
dividends (Leroy, 2004).  Kindleberger deals with cases where information is 
asymmetric.  However, he does not assume (á la Mishkin, 1999) that differences in 
insider and outsider expectations are exogenous.  This paper explains expectational 
divergences by distinguishing between information and disinformation and by formally 
introducing the disinformational efforts of an “overpromoting” team of profit-
maximizing entrepreneurs who strive to influence the expectations held by the investing 
herd. 
 
II. Hyper-rational Expectations vs. Herded Rationality 
 
  Financial information may be deemed perfectly true and timely only if it 
conforms to all relevant facts that are knowable at a given time.  Disinformation consists     October 12, 2004 
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of false and half-true statements or opinions that interested parties convince others to take 
seriously.  Its message is designed to be negatively correlated with unfavorable 
information that insiders manage to withhold from outsiders and sometimes (through the 
psychological mechanism of denial) even from themselves.  Financial disinformation 
relies on deceptive reports and misleading claims about upside and downside risks.  The 
spurious elements or false implications of these claims are shaped for the express purpose 
of preventing outside counterparties from grasping the full-information or “inside” risks 
inherent in holding a particular class of assets (Kane, 2004). 
  Rational expectations is a dynamic equilibrium concept, in which “expectations 
generate outcomes which confirm the original expectations” (Savin, 1992, p. 285).  The 
governing intuition is that rational individuals must eventually perceive that they are 
making persistent systematic forecast errors (if they make them) and adapt their ways of 
forecasting to eliminate such errors.  “Eventually” is what Charlie liked to call a weasel 
word.  The error-learning that the rational-expectations hypothesis entails should be rapid 
if: (a) the stochastic part of the process being forecast is stationary and asymptotically 
mean-convergent and (b) data on reported outcomes can be verified costlessly.  Let us 
suppose that data on the current value of the determinants Xt of the future values of any 
variable Yt+k (k = 1, 2, . . .) contain both relevant information (It) and disinformation (Dt).   
  In the case where assumptions (a) and (b) both obtain, 
 
    E(Yt+k￿Xt) = E(Yt+k￿It + Dt) = E(Yt+k￿It), k = 1, 2, . . .                          (1) 
 
In words, (1) assumes a benign informational environment, which allows a “Hyper-
Rational Expectations Hypothesis” to hold.  It requires that consensus expectations of any 
financial variable conditional on the sum of existing information and disinformation are 
unaffected by the disinformation (no matter how cleverly the disinformation might be 
framed and conveyed). 
  Charlie would laugh if someone were to ask him to analyze the consequences of 
relaxing the stochastic assumptions (a), but it is fully consistent with his way of thinking 
to reject assumption (b).  The resulting “Herded Rationality Hypothesis” assumes instead 
that the cost (Vt) to outsiders of fully verifying current data reported by entrepreneurs     October 12, 2004 
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makes disinformation effective and that this cost increases with the amount, complexity, 
and novelty of the disinformation that herders imbed in their reports.  The larger this cost, 
the more reasonable it becomes for investors to use low-effort substitutes for hyper-
rational calculation. 
  Of course, rationality requires that the influence of disinformation on future 
values of Y must vanish asymptotically (cf. Kane, 1996).  If we conceive Yt to be the 
price of one or more speculative assets, the purpose of rational overpromotion is to 
increase current expectations of future values above E(Yt+k￿It), so that effects of 
disinformation on expectations must now be written as E(Yt+k￿Dt;Vt) and these effects 
must be positive at least for a subset of nearby k.  I propose to redefine rationality so that 
it requires only that the influence of Dt on expectations of future prices eventually 
declines with their futurity k.  As the great impressionist Paul Cézanne opined in the year 
before his death: “Time and reflection . . . modify little by little our vision, and at last 
comprehension comes to us.” 
  Cézanne held that our preconceptions routinely limit our ability to see and to 
reason, a view confirmed by experiments performed by cognitive psychologists.  Arrow 
(1982) notes that the scientific method does not allow adherents to hypotheses about the 
rationality of expectations formation to neglect this robust experimental evidence.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974 and 1981) pioneered the idea that it may be irrational for 
individuals faced with uncertainty not to shirk some of the time-consuming and 
burdensome intellectual tasks of cataloging all possible outcomes and the risks that attach 
to them.  They and others have empirically supported the hypothesis that, in forming and 
modifying judgments about the future in response to events that introduce or resolve 
particular risks, individuals make use of low-effort rules of thumb or “heuristics.”  Like a 
minimalist’s model, a heuristic deliberately simplifies the processing of incoming 
information.  In taking a heuristic shortcut, an individual makes a calculated gamble 
much like the act of investing itself.  The user rationally (but perhaps to his or her future 
regret) accepts a higher incidence of mistakes in exchange for a saving in the time and 
energy allocated to assembling a provisional probability distribution.  However, there is 
no reason to assume the existence of a universal heuristic that applies to all situations.       October 12, 2004 
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  Arrow goes on to cite two well-documented heuristics that, as alternatives to the 
hyper-rational expectations hypothesis, go a long way toward explaining the existence of 
occasional asset-pricing bubbles.  The first is the representativeness heuristic (RH).  The 
RH roots excessive market reactions to current information in individuals’ well-
documented habit of judging the likelihood of a future event by the similarity of current 
evidence to it.  This heuristic rationalizes a dual tendency for individuals both to 
undervalue older information (especially distant history) in a long-lived price run-up and 
to expend little effort on exploring the potentially superficial quality of the information 
and disinformation they may have currently in hand.  Since bubbles and crises are 
infrequent, the RH implies that perceptions of the threat these events pose declines as 
fewer and fewer members of the population have directly experienced them. 
  The second heuristic fosters an opportunity for promoters to generate income by 
manipulating the informational environment to make disinformation persuasive.  This 
heuristic posits that the framing of issues and questions—i.e., the precise way in which 
various situations are formulated—can and does affect the opinions most individuals will 
express or draw about them.  Glaeser (2003) relates such context-dependence to 
situationalism: the behavioral hypothesis that decisions are based disproportionately on 
local influences and short horizons.  This heuristic implies that, during times of great 
technological and social transition, credulous investors may prove extraordinarily easy to 
deceive. 
  Experiments in the burgeoning field of behavioral finance identify several other 
situational elements and heuristics (Ricciardi, 2003), each of which might assist an 
overpromoter to implant or spread disinformation.  Glaeser (2003) notes that self-
interested investors are more likely to accept and to hold overlong to beliefs that make 
them happier (i.e., promise to make them wealthier) and more likely to indoctrinate 
others in these beliefs when their missionary work promises to increase the price of assets 
they hold.  However, there is no reason to assume that a single set of heuristics applies to 
all situations.  In choosing a particular expectations-information shortcut, an individual 
makes a calculated subjective gamble that closely resembles the act of investing itself.  
As a testable empirical statement about the limits of arbitrage opportunities and the     October 12, 2004 
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rationality of producing and spreading disinformation, the concept of herded rationality 
turns on whether profits can be earned by one or more malicious shepherds. 
 
III. Rational Overpromotion 
 
  To make overpromotion rational, we need to make assumptions about the costs 
and benefits of producing disinformation.  When managers’ wealth is sensitive to their 
firm’s stock-price or accounting performance, they may be able to benefit by hiding 
adverse information or exaggerating their firm’s prospects.  Moreover, it may pay brokers 
and financial analysts to join in the overpromotion. 
  The benefits in question will be temporary and will be offset to some degree by 
the discounted value of anticipated personal stress (Pt) that unsavory behavior and 
accompanying prospects of reputational and career damage generate.  Rational executives 
must expect labor markets and the government to eventually punish executives that are 
found to have engaged in fraud or negligent misrepresentation. 
  Holding externally imposed legal and career penalties fixed, the value of Pt will 
vary directly with an executive’s sense of honor and inversely with his or her personal 
discount rate (á la Fisher, 1930).  For opportunistic individuals with a high rate of time 
preference, the disincentive exercised by distant and uncertain punishments is easily 
overcome by the promise of nearby rewards.  Other things equal, such persons are more 
likely to serve as overpromoters. 
  We assume that anticipated personal benefits Bt(Dt;Vt) net of penalties may be 
expressed as a weighted integral of equation (1) between t and t+h, where h is the 
anticipated life of the scam:   
 
        Bt(Dt;Vt) = ￿
+
t
h t  bk E(Yt+k￿Dt; Vt)dk – Pt.           (2) 
 
In (2), bk is nonnegative and declines on average with k. 
  For individuals for which internal and external ethical codes and penalties are 
severe enough, (2) itself may be negative.  Otherwise, rational individuals must weigh the     October 12, 2004 
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benefits of producing disinformation against its production cost.  We presume that the 
nominal costs of framing and disseminating effective disinformation are the same for 
everyone and increasing both in the amount of disinformation to be produced and in the 
time that the effort to mislead investors has been underway.  We represent the discounted 
value of these costs as Ct(Dt).  On average, the marginal cost of maintaining the 
overpromotion rises over time as the overpromoters’ credibility is undermined and finally 
destroyed by convincing whistleblowers or by the uncontrollable buildup of persuasive 
contrary evidence.  At each date, the overpromoter chooses Dt to maximize: 
 
        ￿ (Dt) = Bt(Dt;Vt) - Ct(Dt; Vt).             (3) 
 
In cases where transparent counterevidence suddenly drives Vt toward zero, a dramatic 
price adjustment occurs: (say) at date t + h*.  Under these circumstances, prices collapse 
to the risk-adjusted value of E(Yt+h*￿It+h*) and the further production of disinformation 
about the assets encased in the bubble ceases to be profitable. 
  Besides explaining asset bubbles, recognizing the potential profitability of 
overpromotion accounts for the existence of watchdog professions and government 
securities and exchange commissions.  Of course, watchdog institutions operate under 
incentive conflicts and restraints on their authority that are bound to limit their 
effectiveness (Kane, 2004). 
  
IV. Casting a Long Shadow 
 
  W.H. Auden once remarked that “poets adore explosions, thunderstorms, 
tornadoes, conflagrations, ruins, scenes of spectacular carnage.”  So it was with Charlie.  
His poetic representation of financial carnage evoked a follow-on round of academic 
explosions.  These explosions shook the very foundations of the long-dominant hyper-
rational paradigm of finance.  For that, he is justly regarded as a founding father of the 
neo-impressionist school of behavioral finance.  For economists who want their 
assumptions to preserve as much rationality as they can, my paper offers a more     October 12, 2004 
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measured way to respond to Charlie’s challenge: by recognizing that entrepreneurs and 
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